Hng Ti Hi Phc TTCKVN

Cu trc s hu, hiu qu

hot ng v gi tr doanh nghip trn
th trng chng khon Vit Nam
V Xun Vinh

Trng i hc Kinh t TP.HCM

uan h gia s hu t chc, hiu qu hot ng v gi tr doanh

nghip l mt vn ln v l mt ch thu ht nhiu hc gi
trong lnh vc ti chnh doanh nghip. S dng cc phng php
hi quy cho d liu bng bao gm hi quy tc ng c nh v GMM, vi d
liu nghin cu l cc ch s ti chnh ca cc doanh nghip nim yt trn Sn
giao dch chng khon TP.HCM t 2007 n 2012, nghin cu ny xem xt mi
quan h gia s hu t chc, hiu qu hot ng v gi tr doanh nghip ca
cc cng ty nim yt. Kt qu cho thy cc cng ty c s hu t chc cao th hiu
qu hot ng cao v gi tr doanh nghip cao.
T kha: Hiu qu hot ng, gi tr doanh nghip, s hu t chc.

1. Gii thiu

Cng vi s pht trin ca th

trng chng khon, s lng cc
cng ty nim yt tng dn qua cc
nm. Cho n cui nm 2012, s
lng cc doanh nghip nim yt
trn Sn giao dch chng khon
TP.HCM l 314 doanh nghip.
Mt trong nhng vn ang
c quan tm t nhiu bn lin
quan, c bit l nh u t, cc
nh lp php v cc hc gi quan
tm l vn cu trc s hu v
hiu qu hot ng ca doanh
nghip. Cc nhm c ng khc
nhau th c nhng quyn li v
li ch khc nhau, c nhng quan
h khc nhau vi chnh ph, vi
ngn hng, vi i tc chin
lc nn c cu s hu c nh
hng ln n nhng quyt nh
ca doanh nghip v tc ng
n hiu qu hot ng cng

28

nh gi tr doanh nghip khc

nhau. Nhiu nghin cu xem xt
tc ng ca c cu s hu ln
hiu qu hot ng ca doanh
nghip tuy nhin kt qu cha
thng nht (Belkhir 2009; Fauzi
& Locke 2012; Jones, Kalmi &
Mygind 2005; La Porta et al.
2000; Lin et al. 2011; Margaritis
& Psillaki 2010; Porta, Lopezde-Silanes & Shleifer 1999; Yu
2005). Nghin cu gn y ca
Rydqvist, Spizman & Strebulaev
(2014) cho rng k t th chin
th hai, s hu ca cc cng ty
trn ton th gii c dn dn
thay th bng s hu gin tip
thng qua cc t chc ti chnh
do cc chnh sch ca chnh ph
nh chnh sch thu. Ngoi ra,
nghin cu tc ng ca cu trc
s hu ni chung, s hu t chc
ni ring n hiu qu hot ng
v gi tr doanh nghip VN

PHT TRIN & HI NHP S 16 (26) - Thng 05-06/2014

cha nhiu. Do vy, ng gp

u tin ca nghin cu ny l
lm giu cho kho tng hc thut
v ch ny VN.
Nghin cu ny c mt s
hm cho chnh sch kinh t
hin ti ca Chnh ph. Mt l,
ch trng thu ht u t nc
ngoi bng vic nng trn s
hu ca nh u t nc ngoi
trn th trng chng khon. Hai
l, ch trng c phn ha cc
doanh nghip nh nc v thoi
vn bt ti cc doanh nghip.
Ba l, vic khuyn khch cc nh
u t t chc bao gm cc qu
u t, cc doanh nghip ln c
li th v ti chnh, kinh nghim
qun tr, iu hnh tham gia u
t vo doanh nghip, c bit l
doanh nghip c phn ha nng
cao hiu qu hot ng ca doanh
nghip. Bn l, nghin cu v
cu trc s hu v hiu qu hot

Hng Ti Hi Phc TTCKVN

ng ca doanh nghip l mt
cng c ca chnh ph trong vic
m bo hiu qu hot ng tt
nht ca doanh nghip (Kang &
Kim 2012).
2. C s l thuyt v gi thuyt
nghin cu

Jensen & Meckling (1976)

t nn mng cho nghin cu
v ch ny khi cho rng cu
trc s hu c tc ng n hiu
qu hot ng ca doanh nghip.
Nghin cu ny cho rng nu
mt doanh nghip c cc c ng
ln th s lm tng hiu qu hot
ng v gi tr doanh nghip. Tuy
nhin, c nhiu nghin cu bc
b quan im ny (Porta, Lopezde-Silanes & Shleifer 1999) da
trn l thuyt ngi i din
(agency theory) khi cho rng mt
khi doanh nghip s hu bi cc
loi c ng ln s c hin tng
cc c ng ln thu li ring cho
h lm cho doanh nghip c hiu
qu hot ng km hn. Vn
ny tr nn nghim trng hn
cc nc ang pht trin nh VN
do iu kin v kh nng kim
sot ca lut php cha hon
chnh, cha bo v c c ng
nh. Gn y, nhiu nghin cu
tc ng ca s hu t chc ln
hiu qu hot ng v gi tr
doanh nghip.
Gi thuyt nghin cu
Jensen (1986) da trn gi
thuyt v dng tin t do cho
rng c ng t chc c kh nng
gim st, kim sot cc hot ng
ca cng ty tt hn cc c ng
c nhn. H lun bit to nhng
nh hng n cc quyt nh
cng ty mang li hiu qu
hot ng tt hn. Ngoi ra, cc
nh qun l phi chu s gim st
ca c ng t chc cho nn lun
chu p lc phi lm tng gi tr

doanh nghip (Shleifer & Vishny

1986). Gn y, Elyasiani & Jia
(2010) a ra gi thuyt kim
sot tch cc (Active Monitoring
Hypothesis) cho rng quan h
gia s hu t chc v hiu qu
hot ng v gi tr doanh nghip
l cng chiu. Da vo l thuyt
cng nh cc nghin cu trc,
gi thuyt nghin cu ca bi
bo l:
H1: T l s hu ca c ng
t chc c quan h cng chiu
vi gi tr doanh nghip.
H2: T l s hu ca c ng
t chc c quan h cng chiu
vi gi tr doanh nghip.
3. D liu, m hnh v phng
php nghin cu

D liu nghin cu c thu

thp ca 259 cng ty nim yt
trn Sn giao dch chng khon
TP.HCM giai on t 2007 n
2012 t cc bo co ti chnh, bo
co thng nin ca cc cng ty
c cng b v t S Giao dch
Chng khon HOSE. D liu
khng bao gm cc cng ty sp
nhp, cng ty ti chnh trong giai
on nghin cu. D liu c cu
cu trc d liu bng.
Tng t nh cc nghin
cu trc ca Bhattacharya &
Graham (2009), m hnh nghin
cu c s dng nh sau:
PERFORMANCEit = +
1INSTit + 3SIZEit + 4DEBTit +
2INVESTit + 5SALESit + it
v
VALUEit = + 1INSTit +
3SIZEit + 4DEBTit + 2INVESTit
+ 5SALESit + it
Trong :
- PERFORMANCEit l ch s
o lng hiu qu hot ng ca
doanh nghip, c o lng

bi hai ch s EPS v ROA ti

thi im cui nm t ca cng ty
i, trong ch s EPS i din
cho thu nhp ca mi c phiu
(hay i din cho kh nng sinh
li doanh nghip i vi mi c
ng) v ROA i din cho kh
nng sinh li hay hiu qu to ra
thu nhp ca ti sn. EPS c
tnh bng thu nhp sau thu chia
cho s c phiu ang lu hnh
v ROA c xc nh bng li
nhun sau thu dnh cho c ng
ca cng ty m trn tng ti sn
thi im cui nm ti chnh
(Lam, Sami & Zhou 2012; Wei
& Xiao 2009).
- VALUEit l ch s o lng
hiu qu hot ng ca doanh
nghip, c o lng bi hai ch
s TobinQ v MTB ti thi im
cui nm t ca cng ty i, trong
ch s Tobin Q i din cho gi tr
ti sn doanh nghip iu chnh
theo th trng v MTB i din
cho gi tr k vng ca nh u
t i vi doanh nghip. TobinQ
c tnh bng gi tr th trng
ca ti sn v n trn gi tr s
sch ca ti sn v n. Do VN
cha c th trng n v khng
c s liu chnh thc v n nn
nghin cu ny gi nh gi tr
th trng ca n bng gi tr s
sch. MTB c tnh bng gi tr
th trng ca doanh nghip (tnh
bng vn ha th trng chia cho
gi tr s sch ca doanh nghip)
(Kang & Kim 2012).
- INSTit l t l s hu ca
c ng t chc c tnh bng
s lng c phn s hu bi c
ng t chc c s hu t 5%
tr ln chia cho tng s c phn
ang lu hnh ti thi im cui
nm ti chnh.
- SIZEit l ch s i din cho
quy m ca cng ty i nm t.

S 16 (26) - Thng 05-06/2014 PHT TRIN & HI NHP

29

Hng Ti Hi Phc TTCKVN

Quy m cng ty o bng logarit
t nhin tng ti sn ti thi im
cui nm ti chnh (Chen et al.
2005; Farinha 2003; Gugler &
Yurtoglu 2003; Harada & Nguyen
2011; Lam, Sami & Zhou 2012;
Ramli 2010; Smith & Watts
1992; Thanatawee 2013; Wei &
Xiao 2009).
- DEBTit i din cho t l
n ca cng ty i nm t. Nhiu
nghin cu cho thy t l n l
yu t chnh c tc ng quyt
nh n hiu qu hot ng ca
cng ty, c bit l trong giai
on kh khn ny ca nn kinh
t VN. Mt cng ty c t l n
thp th c nhiu kh nng hot
ng hiu qu v mt ti chnh
cao hn l cc cng ty c t l
n cao. DEBT c xc nh
bng tng n trn tng ti sn
ti thi im cui nm ti chnh
(Aivazian, Booth & Cleary 2003;
Jensen, Solberg & Zorn 1992;
Lam, Sami & Zhou 2012; Wei &
Xiao 2009),
- INVESTit l ch s i din
cho c hi tng trng ca cng
ty i ti thi im t. Tng t nh
(Wei & Xiao 2009), chng ti s
dng t l tng trng ti sn ca
cng ty i din cho c hi
tng trng ca cng ty. Cng
ty c c hi tng trng cao th
c gi nh l hot ng c

hiu qu hn cc cng ty khng

c c hi tng trng (Smith &
Watts 1992).
- SALESit l ch s doanh thu
ca cng ty v c tc ng trc
tip n li nhun ca cng ty.
Khi c lng m hnh hi quy
th SALES c tnh bng logarit
t nhin ca tng doanh thu ca
cng ty (Bhattacharya & Graham
2009; Himmelberg, Hubbard &
Palia 1999).
- it l phn d khng quan st
ca cng ty i thi im t.
Phng php nghin cu
Chng ti s dng phng
php nghin cu l phng php
c lng hi quy cho d liu
bng. Thng thng, vi m
hnh hi quy d liu bng th c
hai c lng l c lng c
nh (fixed effects) v c lng

ngu nhin (random effect). Bi

bo s dng kim nh Hausman
la chn c lng c nh
hay c lng ngu nhin. Kt
qu kim nh Hausman cho thy
cc m hnh hi quy s dng c
lng c nh c la chn.
tinh gn chng ti khng trnh
by cc kt qu kim nh y.
Ngoi ra, bi bo cn s dng
c lng GMM (Generalized
Methods of Moments) c
lng m hnh. c lng GMM
c coi l mt c lng u
vit gii quyt hin tng ni
sinh trong m hnh.
4. Kt qu v tho lun kt qu

Bng 1 m t c tnh thng k

ca cc bin trong nghin cu.
H s tng quan gia cc
bin c m t Bng 2. Kt

Bng 1: Thng k m t cc bin

Bin

Gi tr
trung bnh

Gi tr
ln nht

Gi tr
nh nht

lch
chun

EPS

3442,9440

32507,0000

-10332,0000

3460,6980

ROA

0,0786

0,5484

-0,6455

0,0830

TOBIN_Q

1,2077

7,2524

0,3403

0,7203

MTB

1,4022

9,4350

0,1484

1,3175

INST

0,4802

0,9675

0,0000

0,2617

SIZE

13,6982

17,6254

11,3920

1,1110

DEBT

0,4819

0,9575

0,0311

0,2103

INVEST

0,2504

5,7223

-0,6742

0,5146

SALES

13,4640

18,0394

8,2292

1,2328

Bng 2 Ma trn tng quan gia cc bin

Bin

30

EPS

ROA

TOBIN_Q

MTB

INST

SIZE

DEBT

INVEST

EPS

ROA

0.783

TOBIN_Q

0.383

0.427

MTB

0.371

0.363

0.890

INST

0.146

0.222

0.160

0.114

SIZE

0.080

-0.090

0.076

0.116

0.171

DEBT

-0.205

-0.479

-0.155

-0.066

-0.124

0.326

INVEST

0.200

0.160

0.268

0.299

-0.092

0.093

0.038

SALES

0.229

0.076

0.112

0.115

0.217

0.647

0.302

0.038

PHT TRIN & HI NHP S 16 (26) - Thng 05-06/2014

SALES

Hng Ti Hi Phc TTCKVN

Bng 3: Kt qu hi quy OLS vi bin ph thuc l EPS, ROA; bin c lp l INST
qu bng ny th hin
cc h s tng quan
Bin ph thuc EPS
Bin ph thuc ROA
gia cc bin nghin cu
TC
GMM
TC
GMM
khng c cp no ln
H s
Prob,
H s
Prob,
H s
Prob,
H s
Prob,
hn 0.8. Do vy, khi s
C
-1,1126
0,0053
-0,2145
0,1815
-0,0636
0,4467
0,0699
0,0496
dng m hnh hi quy s
INST
0,1436
0,0293
0,1050
0,0623
0,0100
0,0142
0,0447
0,0004
t c kh nng gp hin
-0,1106
0,0029
-0,0318
0,0226
-0,0226
0,0036
-0,0122
0,0001
tng quan gia cc SIZE
DEBT
-0,4653
0,0000
-0,4271
0,0000
-0,2186
0,0000
-0,1956
0,0000
bin (multicolinearity).
0,1551
0,0000
0,2843
0,2467
0,0320
0,0000
0,0055
0,9187
iu nay cung c INVEST
SALES
0,2294
0,0000
0,0807
0,0000
0,0405
0,0000
0,0181
0,0000
kim inh lai bng cach
0,7491
s dung h s VIF khi R-squared 0,6713
Adjusted
chay hi quy v kt qu R-squared 0,5585
0,6629
cho thy khng c hin F-statistic
8,6944
5,9490
tng t tng quan Prob(F0,0000
0,0000
(chng ti khng trnh statistic)
by cc kim nh VIF
Bng 4: Kt qu hi quy OLS vi bin ph thuc l TOBINQ, MTB; bin c lp l INST
y cho gn).
Bng 3 trnh by kt
Bin ph thuc l TOBINQ
Bin ph thuc l MTB
qu hi quy vi bin ph
TC
GMM
TC
GMM
thuc l EPS v ROA,
H s
Prob,
H s
Prob,
H s
Prob,
H s
Prob,
bin c lp i din cho
C
14,460
0,000
-0,184
0,403
29,985
0,000
-0,610
0,912
s hu l INST. Kt qu
0,571
0,012
0,328
0,000
1,250
0,002
0,506
0,080
cho thy cc h s c INST
-1,137
0,000
0,040
0,036
-2,549
0,000
0,063
0,948
lng ca bin INST SIZE
DEBT
0,866
0,001
-0,405
0,000
3,229
0,000
-0,574
0,522
dng. Cc h h hi quy
0,264
0,000
0,895
0,008
0,444
0,000
3,160
0,125
ny c ngha thng k INVEST
SALES
0,116
0,049
0,042
0,047
0,302
0,004
0,026
0,960
mc 1% khi m hnh
0,568
0,604
c c lng s dng R-squared
Adjusted
phng php tc ng c
0,420
0,468
R-squared
nh v GMM. Nh vy,
F-statistic
3,830
4,440
c th khng nh rng s
Prob(F0,000
0,000
hu ca cc t chc c tc statistic)
ng dng n hiu qu
Ngun: Tnh ton ca tc gi
hot ng ca doanh nghip nim
yt trn Sn giao dch chng khon
cng c tc ng dng n cng cao v gi thuyt H1 c
TP.HCM.
gi tr doanh nghip ca doanh chp nhn.
Bng 4 trnh by kt qu
nghip nim yt trn Sn giao
- Nu cng ty c s hu ca cc
hi quy vi bin ph thuc l
dch chng khon TP.HCM hay c ng t chc cng cao th gi tr
TOBINQ v MTB, bin c lp
ni cch khc s hu t chc ca doanh nghip cng cao v gi
i din cho s hu l INST. Kt
cng cao th gi tr doanh nghip thuyt H2 c chp nhn.
qu cho thy phn cc h s c
cng cao.
T kt qu ca nghin cu,
lng ca bin INST dng. Cc
Tm li, kt qu ca nghin cu chng ti cho rng Chnh ph cn
h s hi quy ny c ngha
cho cc kt lun i vi cc gi c chnh sch khuyn khch cc
thng k khi m hnh c c
thuyt nghin cu nh sau:
qu u t, cc nh ch ti chnh
lng s dng phng php
- Nu cng ty c s hu ca cc u t vo cc doanh nghip h c
GMM. Nh vy, c th khng
c ng t chc cng cao th hiu li th, c bit l cc doanh nghip
nh rng s hu ca cc t chc
qu hot ng ca doanh nghip ang c phn ha nng cao hiu

S 16 (26) - Thng 05-06/2014 PHT TRIN & HI NHP

31

Hng Ti Hi Phc TTCKVN

qu hot ng v gi tr th trng
ca doanh nghip.
Ngoi ra, kt qu nghin cu
cng cho chng ta thy mt s
c trng ca cc doanh nghip
trn Sn giao dch chng khon
TP.HCM. C th, cng ty cng ln
th tng trng v thu nhp thp
hn cc cng ty nh v c th
trng nh gi thp hn cc cng
ty nh. Cng ty c t l n cao th
hiu qu hot ng thp. Cng ty
c c hi u t cao th hiu qu
hot ng cao hn. Cc cng ty
c doanh thu cao th hiu qu hot
ng cao hn.
5. Kt lun

Nghin cu ny xc nh mi
quan h gia cu trc s hu v
hiu qu hot ng ca cc doanh
nghip trn th trng chng khon
VN. Kt qu cho thy cc doanh
nghip c s hu t chc cng cao
th hiu qu hot ng v gi tr
doanh nghip cng cao.
Nghin cu c mt s hm
v mt chnh sch nh sau. Th
nht, Chnh ph nn c cc chnh
sch khuyn khch cc qu u t,
cc t chc tham gia u t vo
doanh nghip v nhng li th v
kinh nghim ca h trong qun tr
iu hnh lm tng hiu qu hot
ng ca cc doanh nghip v gi
tr doanh nghip. Th hai, i vi
ch trng ti cu trc cc doanh
nghip nh nc, trong c chnh
sch c phn ha cc doanh nghip
nh nc th vic m phn vi cc
t chc h tham gia ngay t u
s m bo hiu qu hot ng ca
doanh nghip v tng gi tr doanh
nghip khi nim yt trn th trng
chng khon l
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