- BATTLE OF DIEN BIEN PHU VICTORY OF VIETNAM CULTURE. - Following are major factors for the victory in the battle: 1) Sound political and military guidelines of the Communist Party led by President Ho Chi Minh. - 2) Skilful and creative application of Vietnam’s military sciences and art in the new epoch. - and, 3) Application of patriotism and heroism of our army and people under the leadership of the Communist Party.. - In the broad sense, culture is crystallization of the most valuable and the finest things related to creative activities of man. - Application of the above-mentioned sense in the topic of this paper, we can affirm that Vietnam culture is crystallized from material and non-material values as well as material and spiritual activities created by our ancestors for thousands years of the country building and protection.. - Drawing experience from a lot of victories in fighting against cruel invasion of the Northern feudal forces, the ancestors built our own special military theory and art. - Battle of Dien Bien Phu. - “Take advantage of weakness and constrain strong points of the enemy” (Tran Hung Dao). - The military theory and art are an integral part of Vietnam culture in the Middle Ages.. - and, to combine the national force with advantages of the epoch, resulting in a greater force to fight for the country independence and freedom.. - Immediately after the August Revolution in 1945, followed by the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, however, French colonialists came back to provoke in Southern Vietnam. - In the face of such a situation, President Ho Chi Minh and the Central Committee of Communist Party, on the one hand, called upon people in Southern Vietnam together to carry out a war of resistance against the French colonialists. - On the other hand, they tried to negotiate with representatives of the French government for the sake of getting a peace treaty. - Responding to the interview of the Paris- Saigon Newspaper on the 13 th December 1946, President Ho Chi Minh stated: “Our compatriots and I sincerely long for peace.. - The appeal for the nationwide resistance war made by President Ho Chi Minh reflects concisely the political and military guidelines of Vietnam’s Communist Party and government in the resistance war.. - The above-mentioned strategic guidelines were proved in the first 7 – 8 years of the resistance war. - In the meanwhile, aggressive plans of. - French government was also changed 17 times, due to which 5 high commissioners and 6 commanders-in-chief of the French troops in Indochina were in turn recalled back to France. - Due to such a critical situation, in May 1953 the French premier appointed Henri Navarre, a four-star general, as the 7 th Commander-in-chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina, corresponding to the negotiation with the United States.. - The defensive position would be maintained in the North. - whereas strategic attacks would be made in the South. - and, b) In the autumn and winter of 1954: Most of the French Union Forces would be moved to the North in order to carry out the “total attack” as a decisive battle, forcing Vietnam Government to agree with all requests raised by the French government in negotiations.. - In the second half of 1953, Navarre made a reckless decision. - He sent paratroopers to Lang Son, destroying some our warehouses, launched a large scale raid in Binh Tri Thien, carried out a number of operations in the Red River Delta, and reinforced raiding activities in Lao Cai and Lai Chau.. - In the early October 1953, a meeting of the Politburo was held in Tin Keo (Dinh Hoa District, Thai Nguyen province) and chaired by President Ho Chi Minh, in order to discuss strategic directions for the period of the winter 1953 and the spring 1954. - At the meeting, General Vo Nguyen Giap presented a report on Navarre’s scheme, analyzing details of the fighting situation and outlining a Winter-Spring plan of the Army Central Committee. - It was a big plan with a lot of important guidelines, aiming at breaking every intention of the enemy.. - The winter-spring plan of the Army Central Committee plan was completely approved. - At the end of the meeting, President Ho Chi Minh said: “Regarding to the area for operations, we will focus our forces mainly on the Northwest. - Realizing that our regular troops mainly moved towards the Northwest, in the middle of November 1953, Navarre sent 6 paratroop battalions to Dien Bien Phu, in order to provide support for the withdrawal of the French troops. - In early December, our troops carried out an attack and wiped out a majority of the French troops that were withdrawing from Lai Chau. - Dien Bien Phu was, consequently, besieged by our forces. - During the next several months, Vietnam’s regular troops coordinated with the liberation troops of Pathet Lao (a communist political movement and organization in Laos) to carry out attacks in central Laos and lower Laos and subsequently in the Northeast of Cambodia. - (3) Cited from Dien Bien Phu Thunder, The People’s Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 1984, p.61.. - (4) Vo Nguyen Giap (2004), Looking back Dien Bien Phu after 50 Years, The People’s Army Publishing House, Hanoi, p.285.. - of the Interregional No.5 launched attacks in the North of Central Highlands and took control over Kontum province and a large area that connects directly with liberation area in Lower Laos. - With the 5 strategic strokes of attacks, we forced Navarre to scatter passively 70 of all 84 mobile battalions of the French Union Forces in battlefields all over Indochina (6. - In spite of falling in the defensive due to the contradiction between concentrating and scattering the forces, Navarre still kept on sending more troops to Dien Bien Phu, aiming at establishing a major force in Dien Bien Phu that would attract and defeat our regular army. - In late December 1953, the Politburo made a decision about annihilation of all the enemy forces in Dien Bien Phu.. - As a result, a battle of forces, brainpower, strategies and tactics between Vietnam’s army and the French Union Forces would take place in the area of mutual choice.. - By late January 1954, the French Union Forces converged in Dien Bien Phu consisted of 10 battalions. - During the battle of Dien Bien. - A delegation of the French government also visited the place and all of them believed that it was an “unconquerable bastion”.. - John O’Daniel, the general commander of the US Army Forces in Pacific also expressed the same comment.. - (6) Hoang Minh Thao (2013), “Dien Bien Phu Victory - The Moral Strength and Military Art Power”, in General Vo Nguyen Giap Lives Forever in the Heart of All Vietnamese People and International Friends, Information and Culture Publishing House, Hanoi, p.180.. - Firstly, it demonstrated that the supreme leader of the Communist Party and Vietnam government had high confidence in General Vo Nguyen Giap, “the eldest brother” of Vietnam People’s Army, who had been experienced and clever in the battlefield and had already defeated in turn 6 commanders-in-chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina. - The principle required that “the Commander in battlefield” should investigate and analyze thoroughly the situation in the front. - he should realize precisely and comprehensively advantages and weaknesses of the enemy and our army as well, based on which the most effective combatant plans would be built. - On the 5 th January 1954, General Vo Nguyen Giap, accompanied by Wei Guoqing, the head of the Chinese military advisory group, went towards the front.. - According to the board, we would annihilate all of the enemy troops and get a complete success, if. - In the consultancy meeting of the Battlefield Communist Committee later on, General Giap described big challenges that our army would be unable to deal with, if we followed the plan suggested. - We should have a thorough grasp of the enemy situation, in order to prepare proper solutions, when they make a change” (10). - (10) Vo Nguyen Giap (2000), Dien Bien Phu: A Historic Rendezvous, The People’s Army Publishing House, Hanoi, p.98.. - In the next days, he asked the staff officers to keep track of the enemy situation carefully every hour to be reported. - In the meanwhile, he personally went to check combatant preparation of our troops. - He racked his brain for several nights, in the hope of finding out an appropriate measure. - He urgently summoned the meeting of the Battlefield Communist Committee in the next morning (26 January 1954).. - While waiting for others coming to the meeting, General Giap discussed with the head of the Chinese military advisory group about the decision. - Almost all members of the meeting argued that it was necessary to launch swift attacks. - At the same time, General Giap ordered the 308 th Brigade to move towards Luang Prabang, in order to attract attention of the enemy forces, while we pulled artilleries out.. - This change was afterwards proved as a lucid decision by the reality of the battle in Dien Bien Phu. - General Vo Nguyen Giap, the commander-in-chief as well as the secretary of the battlefield communist committee, was firstly credited with making properly “the most difficult decision in the commanding time” (11. - Owing to his brainpower and firm stuff, he patiently waited for the right chance, carefully considered and cleverly handled situations in order to get a common consensus from both the head of the Chinese advisory group and our military officers. - Especially, the fact that he made the change in the battle strategy just about 6 hours before the previously anticipated start. - It is similar to what Tran Hung Dao recommended his generals and soldiers: “it is necessary to consider changes of the situation. - It was inherited and developed further for the strategic battle in the resistance war against invasion of the French colonialists as well as intervention of the US Army.. - Although President Ho Chi Minh gave General Giap full power to make decisions like a commander in the battlefield, on the one hand, General Giap took the initiative in making the proper decision about changing the battle strategy;. - on the other hand, he wrote an express report to the Politburo, asking for the consensus of the leadership committee. - A few days later, he received a letter from Truong Chinh, the Secretary General of the Communist Party, telling that President Ho Chi Minh and the Politburo unanimously realized that it was completely lucid to make the change. - to carry food and military equipment to the frontline under the rain of lethal weapons launched by the enemy, in the hope of providing constantly our troops with necessary ordnance during the entire campaign. - This was a big surprise for the commanding board of the French Union Forces, because they did think that we could not deal with the logistical difficulties in Dien Bien Phu.. - After the Navarre’s group of fortresses fell, however, some French and Western politicians gave an allegation that Vietnam won in the battle, owing to the weapons and food supported by China. - and (2) 1,700 tons of food, making up 10.8% of all the food used in the campaign (15. - (12) Cited from Summary of the General History of Vietnam, Literature – History – Geography Publishing House, Hanoi, 1958, p.100.. - Navarre was not defeated by means, but by cleverness and will of the opponent” (16). - The change in the battle strategy provided a period of time (about a month and a half) for our troops, enabling them to develop their creativity in besiegement re-disposition and combatant preparation so that we would defeat the enemy with a minimum loss.. - At that time, our soldiers used manual tools to dig hundreds kilometers of combat trenches, thousands of fortifications for men and fire-weapons, and a lot of sleeping and ambulance shelters as well as ammunition pits, making it favorable to move our forces continually under fierce raids of the enemy artilleries and warplanes. - it cut across the airport, preventing and then cutting off completely the air-supply of the enemy. - In the infantry battlefield, our soldiers built a system of solid trenches with hide- outs for artilleries in the hillsides, which was combined with a lot of fake battlefields to trick the opponent. - In the days, when artilleries were pulled to the new positions in the battlefield, and 56 fighting days afterwards as well, there were a lot of examples sacrificing life for the fatherland. - There were a countless number of unknown heroes, who silently struggled with difficulties in order to contribute a part towards the victory of the battle.. - Let’s come back to the main developments of the battle in wits, tactic and strategy between our forces and the enemy.. - On the 12 th March 1954, he sent a mobile group to the liberation area of the Interregional No.5.. - Our artillery opened a fierce bombardment on the fortification, starting the strategic battle in Dien Bien Phu. - (16) Jules Roy (2002), Battle of Dien Bien Phu in the Eyes of the French, Ho Chi Minh City Publishing House, p.449.. - Especially, “we gave the opponent the biggest surprise that we did not accept a total swift battle with all the warlike expeditionary forces of the opponent in the solid group of fortresses. - In the evening of the 7 th May 1954, more than ten thousands soldiers of the enemy in Muong Thanh came out to surrender, due to our massive assault from all directions. - The entire group of fortresses in Dien Bien Phu was then wiped out. - It is the guidelines of the people’s war, in which all people took part comprehensively in the resistance against invasion of the French colonialists, who were also supported by the US army. - time, the guidelines shows how creatively the fundamental principles of Marxist – Leninism about the revolutionary war were applied in the specific situation of the resistance war in Vietnam – where all the people rose as one man to fight for the country unification, independence, for the people’s freedom and happiness as well as for the peace, national independence, democracy and social progress all over the world.. - The second decisive factor for Dien Bien Phu victory is the skilful and creative application of Vietnam military sciences and art in the new epoch.. - Owing to thorough understanding of the war principles, in the meanwhile, the “Supreme Commanding Committee” of Vietnam army arrayed and disposed the troops flexibly, making the French troops follow our scheme and. - After realizing changes in the situations, however, we made a timely decision about changing the combatant plan from “swift attack, swift win” to “slow advance, certain success”. - Analyzing this, General Vo Nguyen Giap wrote: “A precise combatant decision – the decision to wipe out the French group of fortresses in Dien Bien Phu – must contain fully scientism and revolutionism, and must be based on correct and comprehensive assessments of both our forces and the opponent forces” (22. - It is the main content of the commanding art” (23). - Regarding to the art of war, the victory in Dien Bien Phu is the very success of Vietnam’s military sciences and art – a part of the national culture in the new epoch.. - The factor that played a direct decisive role for Dien Bien Phu victory is the patriotism and heroism of our army and people under the leadership of the Communist Party.. - Thus, it is possible to affirm that the patriotism and heroism of our army and people, which were shown specifically and abundantly in the entire Dien Bien Phu campaign, were the fundamental and key values of Vietnam culture. - In the light of Marxist-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh’s thought at the new epoch, the values were much more heightened, resulting in an extraordinary power to defeat the enemy right at the time, when they made the best effort for the war.
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